These authors contributed equally: Satohiro Tajima, Jan Drugowitsch. *e-mail: jan_drugowitsch@hms.harvard.edu; Alexandre.Pouget@unige.ch I n a natural environment, choosing the best of multiple options is frequently critical for an organism's survival. Such decisions are often value-based, in which case the reward is determined by the chosen item (such as when individuals choose between food items; Fig. 1a ), or perceptual, in which case individuals receive a fixed reward if they pick the correct option (Fig. 1b) . Compared to binary choice paradigms [1] [2] [3] , much less is known about the computational principles underlying decisions with more than two options 4 . Some studies have suggested that decisions among 3 or 4 options could be solved with coupled drift diffusion models [4] [5] [6] , which are optimal for binary choices 7 , but, as we are going to show, these become suboptimal once the number of choices grows beyond two. Another option for modeling such choices is to use 'race models' . In race models, the momentary choice preference is encoded by competing evidence accumulators, one per option, which trigger a choice as soon as one of them reaches a decision threshold (Fig. 1c) . Such standard race models imply that both races and static decision criteria are independent across individual options. However, in contrast to race models, the nervous system features dynamic neural interactions across races, such as activity normalization 8, 9 and a global urgency signal 10 . Whether such coupled races are compatible with optimal decision policies for three or more choices is unknown.
At the behavioral level, individuals choosing between three or more options exhibit several seemingly suboptimal behaviors, such as the similarity effect or violations of both the regularity principle and the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) principle 11 . However, before concluding that such behaviors are suboptimal, it is critical to first derive the optimal policy and check whether they are compatible with this policy.
In this study, we adopt such a normative approach. Unlike previous models motivated by biological implementations, we start by deriving the optimal, reward-maximizing strategy for multialternative decision-making, and then ask how this strategy can be implemented by biologically plausible mechanisms. To do so, we first extend a recently developed theory of value-based decisionmaking with binary options 7 to N alternatives, revealing nonlinear and time-dependent decision boundaries in a high-dimensional belief space. Next, we show that geometric symmetries allow reducing the optimal strategy to a simple neural mechanism. This yields an extension of race models with time-dependent activity normalization controlled by an urgency signal 10 .
The model provides an alternative perspective on how normalization and an urgency signal cooperate to implement close-to-optimal decisions for multi-alternative choices. We also demonstrate that the optimal policy is compatible with divisive normalization, which has been widely reported throughout the nervous system 8, 9 . Additionally, in the presence of internal variability, our network replicates the similarity effect and violates both the IIA and regularity principles. Thus, our model isolates the functional components required for optimal decision-making and replicates a range of essential physiological and behavioral phenomena observed for multi-alternative decisions.
Results
The optimal policy for multi-alternative decisions. Suppose we have N alternatives to choose from in perceptual or value-based decisions. The decision-maker's aim is to make choices whose outcome depends on a priori unknown variables (for example, true rewards (Fig. 1a) , or stimulus contrasts (Fig. 1b) ) associated with the individual options, whose values vary across choice trials. We will assume that on a given trial, each short time duration δt yields a piece of noisy momentary evidence about the true values of the hidden variables. For perceptual decision-making, this would correspond to observing new sensory information, while for valuebased decision-making, this might be the result of recalling past experiences from memory 12 . Our derivation shows that the optimal way of accumulating such evidence is to simply sum it up over time (Methods). This reduces the process of forming a belief about these variables to a diffusion (or random walk) process, x(t), in an N-dimensional space, as implemented by race models (Fig. 1d) .
Next, we derive the optimal stopping strategy: when should the decision-maker stop accumulating evidence and trigger a choice? To do so, and in contrast to experiments where participants wait until the end of the trial to respond, we only consider the more natural scenario where the decision-maker is in control of their decision time. In a standard race model, evidence accumulation stops whenever one of the races reaches a threshold that is constant over time and identical across races. In other words, evidence accumulation stops once the diffusing particle hits any sides of an N-dimensional (half-)cube (Fig. 1d ). While simple, this stopping policy is not necessarily optimal. To find the optimal policy, we use tools from dynamic programming 7, 13 . One such tool is the 'value function' V(t,x), which corresponds to the expected reward for being in state x at time t, assuming that the optimal policy is followed from there on. This value function can be computed recursively through a Bellman equation (Methods). For the simple case of a single, isolated choice, the decision-maker aims to maximize the expected reward (or reward per unit time) for this choice minus some cost c for accumulating evidence per unit time. One can imagine several different types of costs, such as, for example, the metabolic cost of accumulating more evidence. Once we embed this single choice within a long sequence of similar choices, an additional cost ρ emerges that reflects missing out on rewards that future choices yield (Methods). Overall, the optimal decision policy results in:
This value function compares the value for deciding immediately, yielding the highest of the N expected rewards ̂…r r , , N 1 , with that for accumulating more evidence and deciding later; ρ is the reward rate (see Methods for the formal definition), t w is the intertrial interval including the nondecision time required for motor movement. The expected reward for each option, r t x ( , ) i i is computed by combining the accumulated evidence with the prior knowledge about the reward mean and variance through Bayes' rule (Methods). As shown by dynamic programming theory, the larger of these two terms yields the optimal value function; their intersection determines the decision boundaries for stopping evidence accumulation and thus the optimal policy. In realistic setups, decision-makers make a sequence of choices, in which case the aim of maximizing the total reward becomes equivalent (assuming a very long sequence of choice) to maximizing their reward rate, which is the expected reward for either choice divided by the expected time between consecutive choices. The value function for this case is the same as that for the single-trial choice, except that both values for deciding immediately and for accumulating more evidence include the opportunity cost of missing out on future rewards (Methods).
We found the optimal policy for this general problem by computing the value function numerically 14 from which we derived the complex, nonlinear decision boundaries (Fig. 2a) . Clearly, the structure of the optimal decision boundaries differs substantially from that of standard race models (Fig. 1d) . Interestingly, we found that they have an important symmetry. They are parallel to the diagonal, that is, the line connecting (0,0,…,0) and (1,1,…,1) (Supplementary Note 1 shows this formally). This symmetry implies that any diffusion parallel to the diagonal line is irrelevant to the final decision, such that we only need to consider the projection of the diffusion process onto the hyperplane orthogonal to this line (Fig. 2b) . The decision boundaries remain nonlinear even in this projection, as depicted by the curvatures of the solid lines in Fig. 2b . Note that for binary choices, our derivation indicates that the projection of the diffusion process onto an (N -1)-dimensional subspace becomes a projection onto a line since N = 2. On this line, the stopping boundaries are just two points and therefore cannot exhibit any nonlinearities. Thus, for N = 2, the optimal policy corresponds to the well-known drift diffusion model of decision-making 7, 13 . Numerical solutions also revealed that the optimal decision boundaries evolve over time; they approach each other as time elapses and finally collapse (Fig. 2b) . These nonlinear collapsing boundaries differ from the linear and static ones of previous approximate models, such as multihypothesis sequential probability ratio tests (MSPRTs) [15] [16] [17] , which are known to be only asymptotically optimal under specific assumptions (Methods).
We show in Supplementary Note 4 that these results generalize to models where the streams of noisy momentary evidence are correlated in time, either with short-range temporal correlations, as is often observed in spikes trains, or with long-range temporal correlations as postulated, for example, in the linear ballistic accumulator model 18, 19 . Our results also apply to experiments such as the ones performed by Thura and Cisek 20, 21 where the momentary evidence is accumulated directly on the screen, in which case there is no need for latent integration.
Circuit implementation of the optimal policy. In the optimal policy we have derived, evidence accumulation is simple: it involves N accumulators, each summing up their associated momentary evidence independent of the other accumulators. By contrast, the stopping rule is complex: at every time step, the policy requires computing N time-dependent nonlinear functions that form the individual stopping boundaries. This rule is nonlocal because whether an accumulator stops depends not only on its own state but also on that of all the other accumulators. A simpler stopping rule would be one where a decision is made whenever one of the accumulators reaches a particular threshold value, as in independent race models. However, this would require a nonlinear and nonlocal accumulation process to implement the same policy through a proper variable transformation. Nonetheless, such a solution would be appealing from a neural point of view since it could be implemented in a nonlinear recurrent network endowed with a simple winner-takes-all mechanism that selects a choice once the threshold is reached by one of the accumulators.
Armed with this insight, we found that a recurrent network with independent thresholds (Fig. 2c) Independent fixed boundaries (Fig. 1d) , they are nonlinear but symmetric with respect to the diagonal (that is, the vector (1,1,1)). b, Lower dimensional projections of decision boundaries at different time points. The solid curves are the optimal decision boundaries projected onto the plane orthogonal to the diagonal (the black triangle in a). The dashed curves indicate the effective decision boundaries implemented by the circuit in c. c, The circuit approximating the optimal policy. Like race models, it features constant decision thresholds that are independently applied to individual options. However, the evidence accumulation process is now modulated by recurrent global inhibition after a nonlinear activation function (the 'normalization' term), a time-dependent global bias input ('urgency signal') and rescaling ('divisive normalization'). d, Schematic illustrations of why the circuit in c can implement the optimal decision policy. The nonlinear recurrent normalization and urgency signal constrain the neural population states to a timedependent manifold (the gray areas). Evidence accumulation corresponds to a diffusion process on this nonlinear ((N − 1)-dimensional) manifold. The stopping bounds are implemented as the intersections (the colored thick curves) of the manifold and the cube (colored thin lines), where the cube represents the independent, constant decision thresholds for the individual choice options. Due to the urgency signal, the manifold moves toward the corner of the cube as time elapses, causing the intersections (that is, the stopping bounds) to collapse onto each other over time.
associated option. The network operates at two timescales. On the slower timescale, neurons accumulate momentary evidence independently across options according to:
where x t is the vector of accumulated evidence at time t, δx t is the vector of momentary evidence at time t and C t is the commonly used divisive normalization,
, denotes the nth component of the vector ∼ x t . This form of divisive normalization merely rescales the space of evidence accumulation, leaving the relative distances between accumulators and stopping bounds intact. As a result, it has no impact on the performance of the model if the stopping bounds are adequately rescaled, and no appreciable impact even without this rescaling. It is included for biological realism because this nonlinearity is found throughout the cortex and in particular in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area 8, 22 . On the faster timescale, activity is projected onto a manifold defined by ∑ = f x u t ( ) ( )
(gray surface in Fig. 2d ), where u(t) is the urgency signal. This operation is implemented by iterating:
until convergence; γ is the update rate and f is a rectified polynomial nonlinearity (see Methods and Supplementary Note 2 for details). This process is stopped whenever one of the integrators reaches a preset threshold. The choice of this projection was motivated by two key factors. First, this particular form ensures that the projection is parallel to the diagonal, that is, the line connecting (0,0,…,0) and (1,1,…,1). As we have seen, diffusion along this axis is indeed irrelevant. Second, the use of a nonlinear function f implies that we do not merely project on the hyperplane orthogonal to the diagonal. Instead, we project onto a nonlinear manifold. This step is what allow us to approximate the original complex stopping surfaces with simpler independent bounds on each of the integrators, as illustrated in Fig. 2d (see Supplementary Note 2 for a formal explanation). The time-dependent urgency signal, u(t), implements a collapsing bound, which is also part of the optimal policy (Fig. 2b) .
Indeed, this urgency signals brings all the neurons closer to their threshold and, as such, is equivalent to the collapse of the stopping bounds over time (Fig. 2d ).
Equations (2), (3) and (4) can be turned into a single differential equation (see equation (40) in the Supplementary Note). The iterative difference equations we show in this article are a particular form of the implementation, making it easier to interpret the diffusion process. Importantly, equations (2) and (3) provide a generalization of divisive normalization, which ensures that evidence is still integrated optimally over time.
The model contains three parameters: the power of the nonlinearity, and the starting point and slope of the urgency signal (Methods). When these parameters are optimized to maximize the reward rate, the network approximates very closely the optimal stopping bounds (Fig. 2b) . As a result, the reward rate achieved by the network is within 98 and 95% of the optimal reward rate for 3 and 4 options, respectively (across a wide range of prior distributions over rewards; see Methods). Normalization and urgency improve task performance. Our circuit model comprises independent decision thresholds for individual options, as in standard race models (consistent with recordings in the LIP area 10 ), but features time-dependent normalization in addition to an urgency signal. To quantify the contribution of each circuit component, we compared the performance of four different circuit models: (1) the standard race model with independent evidence accumulation within each accumulator; (2) a race model with the urgency signal alone; (3) a race model with normalization alone, where normalization refers to equation (4); and (4) the full model with both urgency signal and normalization. Note that all models included divisive normalization (equations (2) and (3)). This comparison revealed that adding the urgency signal and/or normalization to the standard race model indeed improved the reward rate (Fig. 3) . Intriguingly, for both value-based and perceptual decisions, normalization had a much larger impact than the urgency signal, demonstrating the relative importance of normalization in improving the reward rate.
Relation to physiological and behavioral findings. Urgency signal.
We examined how the neural dynamics and behavior predicted by the proposed circuit relates to previous physiological and behavioral findings. First, we found that the average activity in model neurons rises over time, independently of the sensory evidence, consistent with the urgency signals demonstrated in physiological recordings Relative reward rates in value-based (left) and perceptual tasks (right). To quantify the contribution of each circuit component, we compared the performance of four different circuit models: (1) the standard race model with independent evidence accumulation within each accumulator; (2) a race model with only an urgency signal; (3) a race model with only normalization; and (4) the full model with both urgency signal and normalization. We quantified the reward rates of models 1-3 ('reduced models') relative to that of the full model by
F ull Rand , where ρ k (k = 1,2,3) denotes the reward rates of reduced models 1-3; ρ = ∕ z t w Rand is the baseline reward rate of a decision-maker who makes immediate random choices after trial onset; ρ Full is the reward rate of the full model with both normalization and urgency. The performance differences across models shrink with an increasing number of options because the performance shown is relative to a model making random, immediate choices. Indeed, as the number of options to choose from increases, the absolute reward rates of the full and reduced models increase at similar rates, while the performance of the random model remains the same. Each point represents the mean reward rate across 10 6 simulated trials.
of neurons in the LIP area 10 (Fig. 4a) . Interestingly, our model also replicates a gradual decrease in the slope of the average neural activity over time that arises in the model as a consequence of the nonlinear recurrent process.
Decrease in offset activities in multi-alternative tasks. Second, it has been reported that the initial 'offset' (that is, the average neural activity) of evidence accumulation 10, 23 decreases as the number of options increases (Fig. 4b) , although to our knowledge no normative explanation has been offered for this observation. Our circuit model replicates this property when optimized to maximize the reward rate (Fig. 4b) . Indeed, in our model, increasing the number of options while leaving the initial offset unchanged causes a decrease in both accuracy and reaction time, and an associated drop in reward rate. This drop in reward rate can be compensated by lowering the initial offset, which increases both accuracy and reaction time but has a proportionally stronger effect on accuracy such that the reward rate increases.
Hick's law in choice reaction times. Third, the change in the optimal offset also explains the behavioral effects in choice reactions times known as 'Hick's law' 24, 25 . Hick's law is one of the most robust properties of choice reaction times in perceptual decision tasks 24, 25 . In its classic form, it states that mean reaction time (RT) and the logarithm of the number of options (N) are linearly related via RT = a + b log(N + 1). Our model replicates this near-logarithmic relationship (Fig. 4c) . Interestingly, the reaction time dependency on the number of options tends to be much weaker for value-based than perceptual decisions 26 .
Value normalization. Fourth, our model replicates the suppressive effects of neurally encoded values among individual options (Fig. 5a ). In particular, the activity of LIP neurons encodes values of targets inside the neuronal receptive fields, but is also affected by values associated with targets displayed outside the receptive fields 8, 9, 27 . The larger the total target values outside these receptive fields, the lower the neural activity, which is usually described as normalization.
IIA violation. So far, our neural model only has one source of variability, namely the noise corrupting the momentary evidence. However, there are other sources of variability that quite probably exist in the brain. For instance, the decision-maker must learn how to properly adjust the decision bounds to optimize the reward rate, which would result in trial-to-trial variability in the value of the bound. There is experimental evidence suggesting that learning can indeed induce extra variability in decision-making tasks 28 . Variability in bounds and neural responses could also be purposely induced by neural circuits to ensure that the decision-maker does not always choose the option with the highest value but also explores alternatives. Such an exploration behavior is critical in environments where the value of the options varies over time, which is common in real-world situations.
In our neural model, we added such extra variability directly to the accumulator by adding zero-mean Gaussian white noise to the state of the accumulator at each time step t after applying both normalizations (equations (2), (3) and (4)). Despite this extra variability, our neural model continues to outperform the race model ( Fig.  5c and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Stripping the normalization from the full model results in a large drop in reward rate with a further drop, although less pronounced, when the urgency signal is also removed.
Importantly, this version of the model also replicates apparently 'irrational' behavior in humans and animals that violates the IIA principle 29 , an axiomatic property assumed in traditional rational theories of choice 30, 31 . Behavioral studies have shown that the choice between two highly valued options depends on the value of a third alternative option [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] , even if the value of this third option is so low that it is never chosen. One example of such an interaction is shown in Fig. 5b . In this experiment, participants found it increasingly harder to pick among their two top choices as the value of the third option increased. Our noisy neural model exhibits a similar IIA violation (Fig. 5b) , which is primarily caused by divisive normalization. Divisive normalization decreases the mean value difference between the two top options as the value of the third option is increased, making these two options harder to distinguish due the presence of internal variability. In typical physiological experiments, urgency signals are extracted by averaging over neural activities across the entire recorded population, including different stimulus conditions. The thick trace (top) represents such an average for 0% motion coherence trials, whereas the thin trace is its fit to a hyperbolic function 10 . The rationale behind this procedure is that the urgency signal has been considered as a uniform additional input to all parietal neurons involved in the evidence accumulation process. A signal extracted this way is not exactly the same as the global input signal (function u(t) in Fig. 2c) to the circuit, which includes nonlinear activity normalization through recurrent neural dynamics; thus, it does not trivially relate to the empirically observed urgency signals. Nonetheless, the average activity in model neurons was found to replicate the temporal increase, including the saturating temporal dynamics. a.u., arbitrary unit. b, The initial offset activities decrease with an increasing number of options, in both LIP neurons 10 Violation of the regularity principle. In multi-alternative decisionmaking, individuals not only violate the IIA but also the regularity principle. The regularity principle asserts that adding extra options cannot increase the probability of selecting an existing option. We found that the same model that violates the IIA also violates this regularity principle. At first, this may seem counterintuitive. Introducing a third option into a choice set must decrease the probability of picking either of the first two options. However, consider the probability of picking option 1 when option 2 is more valuable. In the absence of a third option, this probability will tend to be very small. When the third option is introduced and its value is increased, IIA violation implies that the probability of picking option 1 relative to option 2 will increase, as illustrated by the shallower psychometric curves in Fig. 5b . Therefore, two factors are with opposite effects are at play: the presence of a third option implies that choices 1 and 2 are picked less often, but the probability of picking option 1 relative to option 2 increases as a result of IIA violation. Our simulations reveal that the second factor dominates when the value of option 1 is smaller than that of option 2, as illustrated in Fig. 6a .
The similarity effect. Our model also replicates the similarity effect that has been reported in the literature 35, 37, 38 . This effect refers to the fact that when individuals are given a third option similar to, say, option 1, the probability of choosing option 1 decreases. To model this effect, we postulated that each object is defined by a set of features and that its overall value is a linear combination of the values of its features. As before, we also assumed that the values of the features are not known exactly. Instead, the brain generates noisy samples of these values over time. In this scenario, the similarity between two objects is proportional to the overlap between their features. This overlap implies that the stream of value samples for the two similar options are correlated while being independent for the third, dissimilar option. Accordingly, we simulated a three-way race where the momentary evidence for options 1 and 3 are positively correlated. As illustrated in Fig. 6b , we found that the probability of choosing option 1 decreases relative to option 2 as the value of option 3 increases, thus replicating the similarity effect. As has been observed experimentally 39, 40 , we found that the similarity effect grows over time during the course of a single trial (Fig. 6c) .
Predictions. Our model makes a number of experimental predictions at both the behavioral and neural levels (see Supplementary Note 3 for further details).
First, during evidence accumulation, the neural population activity should be near an (N − 1)-dimensional continuous manifold (that is, a nonlinear surface), where N is the number of choices (Fig. 2d) . This is a direct consequence of evidence accumulation paired with nonlinear normalization. As the activity of D-neurons is D-dimensional, and since N ≪ D in general, our prediction implies that neural activity should be constrained to a small subspace of the neural activity space. This prediction can be tested with standard dimensionality reduction techniques using multielectrode recordings, although this analysis should be done carefully since our model also predicts that the position of this manifold changes over time. Failure to take this time dependency into account could significantly bias the estimate of the dimensionality of the constraining manifold. Our theory makes 11 additional predictions related to the existence and properties of the manifold, which are listed in Supplementary Note 3. Second, our model correctly predicted the decrease in the initial activity offset (baseline firing rate) value of LIP neurons with the number of choices. Remarkably, this offset decrease results from an economic strategy that maximizes the reward rates by balancing the speed and accuracy in a long sequence of trials under the opportunity cost for future rewards. Thus, the offset should also be modulated by other reward rate manipulations. For example, we predict that increasing the average reward rate by either increasing the reward associated with the choices or decreasing the intertrial interval should raise the offset for a fixed number of choices.
Third, previous studies have considered two types of strategies for multi-alternative decision-making: the 'max versus average' (Fig. 7b) and the 'max versus next' (Fig. 7c) (refs. 6,26,41 ). Our theory predicts that individuals should smoothly transition between these two modes depending on the pattern of rewards across choices (Fig. 7a) , a prediction that can be tested with standard psychophysical experiments. More specifically, when all choices are equally rewarded, or only one choice is highly rewarded, our model predicts that were used to create this panel; in the original experiment, subjects were monkeys and the targets were drops of juice. In both LIP and the model, the response of a neuron to a target associated with a fixed amount of reward decreases as the reward to the other targets increases. In the model, this effect is induced by the normalization. The points represent the mean ± s.d. across 10 6 simulated trials. b, Left: as the value of a third option is increased, the psychometric curve (for a fixed decision time, as set by the experimenter) corresponding to the choice between options 1 and 2 becomes shallower-a result that violates the IIA axiom. Data from ref.
11 were used to create this panel. Right: the model with added neural noise after activity normalization exhibits the same behavior over a total of 10 6 simulated trials. c, In the presence of internal variability, the race model variants without constrained evidence accumulation approximating the optimal policy (second term in equation (2)) perform much worse than our model variants with that constraint (when compared to Fig. 2d) . Each point represents mean reward rate across 10 6 simulated trials.
individuals should adopt a max versus average strategy (Fig. 7d,e) , whereas when two options are highly rewarded, our model predicts that individuals should adopt a max versus next strategy (Fig. 7f) .
Discussion
In this study, we discussed the optimal policy for decisions between more than two valuable options, as well as a possible biological When a third choice is introduced, the probability of choosing option 1 increases as the value of option 3 increases. This effect is only observed when option 1 is much less valuable than option 2. b, The similarity effect: adding a third option, similar to option 1, reduces the probability of choosing option 1 relative to option 2 as the value of option 3 increases. The inset shows that the probability of picking option 1 also decreases as the value of option 3 increases. For both a and b, the model was simulated for 10 6 trials and binned into the five relative reward categories shown. Each of the five lines shows the mean of the respective reward category. c, The strength of the similarity effect increases with time within the course of a single trial, as shown by the decrease in the probability of choosing option 1 as time elapses. The optimal policy predicts a smooth transition between the max versus next and max versus average decision strategies depending on the relative values of the three options. a, The stopping bounds for the optimal policy after projecting the diffusion onto the hyperplane orthogonal to the diagonal. b, The stopping bounds corresponding to the max versus average strategy (thick colored lines). In this strategy, the decision-maker computes the difference between each option's value estimate and the average of the remaining options' values and triggers a choice when this difference hits a threshold. The stopping bounds in this case overlap with the optimal bounds from a (shown as thin colored lines) in the center but not on the side. c, The stopping bounds for the max versus next strategy (thick colored lines). In this strategy, the decision-maker compares the best and second-best value estimates and makes a choice when this difference exceeds a threshold. In a three-alternative choice, this is implemented with three pairs of linear decision boundaries (colored thick lines) corresponding to the three possible combinations of two options. In contrast to the bounds for the max versus average strategy, the bounds for the max versus next strategy overlap with the optimal bounds (thin colored lines) on the edge of the triangle but not in the center. d, When all three options are equally good, the diffusion of the particle is isotropic and therefore more likely to hit the stopping bounds in their centers, where they overlap with the max versus average strategy. e, When one option is much better than the other two, the diffusion is now biased toward the center of the bound corresponding to the good option, which is once again equivalent to the max versus average strategy. f, When two options are equally good, while the third is much worse, the particle will tend to drift toward the part of the triangle corresponding to the two good options (black arrow), where the optimal bound overlaps with the bounds for the max versus next strategy. The blotchy gray curves in d-f illustrate accumulator trajectories that are typical for the considered scenarios, and the black arrows represent the mean drift direction.
implementation. The resulting policy has nonlinear boundaries and thus differs qualitatively from the simple diffusion models that implement the optimal policy for the two-alternative case 7 . More specifically, this work makes four major contributions. First, we prove analytically that the optimal policy involves a nonlinear projection onto an (N − 1)-dimensional manifold, which can be closely approximated by neural circuits with nonlinear normalization (equation (4)). Second, apparently 'irrational' choice behaviors, such as IIA violation, are reproduced by our model in the presence of internal variability and divisive normalization. Third, we found that the distance to the threshold must increase with a set size for optimal performance. This has already been observed experimentally 10, 23 . To our knowledge, no computational explanation has been offered for this effect until now. Fourth, the model follows Hick's law, that is, it predicts that reaction times in value-based decisions should be proportional to the log of the number of choices plus one, as is commonly observed in behavioral choice data. However, our model does not account for the violation of Hick's law for saccadic eye movement effects 42, 43 , or the well know pop-out effect reported in visual search, where reaction times are independent of the number of items on the screen 44 . Capturing these effects requires that we specialize our model to the specific context of these experiments; this is beyond the scope of the present article.
Our replication of IIA violation is similar to what Louie et al. 11 have proposed recently, although they did not consider noise in the momentary evidence and did not derive the optimal policy for multi-alternative decision-making. Therefore, our work demonstrates that an optimal policy for multi-alternative decision-making using divisive normalization violates the IIA in the presence of internal noise. Note that our work shows that divisive normalization is not required for optimal performance when the only source of noise is in the sensory evidence, although another form of normalization (equation (4)) is needed. However, preliminary work by Steverson et al. 45 clarified the conditions under which networks with divisive normalization implement the optimal policy for decision-making with regard to internal noise, thus suggesting that divisive normalization might indeed be required for optimal decision-making when all sources of noise are considered. Moreover, recent proof of equivalence between divisive normalization and an information processing model offers another explanation for the role of divisive normalization-to optimally balance the expected value of the chosen option with the entropic cost of reducing uncertainty in the choice 45 . A well-known strategy to decide between multiple options is the MSPRT 15, 16 ; previous studies have shown that the MSPRT could be implemented/approximated by neural circuits 17, 41, 46 . However, the MSPRT has not been designed for the problems we considered in this study. First, it assumes that the decision-maker receives a fixed magnitude of reward based on choice accuracy (that is, whether they are correct or incorrect) in each trial, as in conventional perceptual decision tasks. Value-based decisions, where the reward magnitude can vary across trials, clearly violate this assumption. Second, it assumes a constant task difficulty whereas the present study assumes the difficulty of both value-based and perceptual choices to vary across these choices. Third, since the MSPRT is only asymptotically optimal in the limit of infinitely small error rates (that is, when the model's performance is nearly 100% correct), it deviates from the optimal policy when this error rate is not negligible 15, 16 . Our present analysis clarifies the properties of the optimal decision policy under multiple options, which differs from the MSPRT by characteristic nonlinear and collapsing decision boundaries. Despite the apparent complexity of those decision boundaries, we found that a symmetry in these boundaries allows the optimal strategies to be approximated by a circuit that features well-known neural mechanisms-race models whose evidence accumulation process is modulated by normalization, an urgency signal and nonlinear activation functions. The model provides a consistent explanation for the functional significance of normalization and urgency signal. They are necessary to implement optimal decision policies for multi-alternative choices where participants control the decision time.
Although we modeled the uncertainty about the true hidden states or values with a single Gaussian process that represents the noisy momentary evidence, in realistic situations the uncertainty could have multiple origins, including both external and internal sources. Potential sources of external noises include the stochastic nature of stimuli, sensory noise and incomplete knowledge about the options (for example, having not yet read the dessert of a particular menu option when choosing among different lunch menus). On the other hand, internal noises could result from learning, exploration, suboptimal computation 47 , uncertain memory or ongoing value inference (for example, sequentially contemplating features of a particular menu course over time). We assumed simplified generative models with an unbiased and uncorrelated Gaussian prior; future extensions should consider more complex setups, including asymmetric mean rewards among options.
Note that the present study considers a simplified case where the value of each option is represented with a scalar variable. We have shown that this model is sufficiently complex to replicate basic behavioral properties, such as Hick's law, similarity effect and violation of both the IIA and regularity principle in multi-alternative choices. Future studies should cover more complex situations, including value comparisons based on multiple features (for example, speeds and designs of cars), which can lead to other forms of context-dependent choice behavior 34, 35, 48 . Decision-making with such a multidimensional feature space requires computing each option's value by appropriately weighting each feature. Some studies suggest that apparently irrational human behavior could be accounted for by heuristic weighting rules for features that integrate feature valences through feedforward 26, 37, 38 or recurrent 39,40 neural interactions. Interestingly, a recent study reported that a contextdependent feature weighting can increase the robustness of value encoding to neural noise in later processing stages 38, 49 , whereas another recent study provided a unified adaptive gain-control model that produces context-dependent behavioral biases 50 . However, to our knowledge, the optimal policy for these more complex models where the value function is computed by combining multiple features, presented sequentially, remains unknown. Once this policy is derived, it will be interesting to determine whether all, or part, of the seemingly irrational behaviors that have been reported in the literature are a consequence of using the optimal policies for such decisions or genuine limitations of the human decisionmaking process.
Finally, the current model provides several interesting predictions on neural population dynamics. Because of normalization, the collective neural activity could be constrained to a lowdimensional manifold during decision-making. The dimensionality of this manifold depends on the number of options (N − 1 dimensions for N-alternative choices), whereas the position of the manifold should depend on time, reflecting the effect of the urgency signal. These predictions could be tested with neurophysiological population recordings combined with advanced dimensionality reduction techniques.
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walk (diffusion) process in a linear space, which is terminated by a set of complex decision boundaries as a stopping rule. However, if we nonlinearly constrain the evidence accumulation space, we can vastly simplify these boundaries and instead can use constant decision thresholds that are independent across options.
More specifically, there exists a variable transformation,
is achieved by a recurrent neural process shown in Fig. 2c , which implements the following updated rule:
where γ is the update rate. The second equation finds the appropriate ∼ Δ x , whereas the first equation performs the projection. This circuit comprises a nonlinear normalization of neural activities, x t *( ) i , controlled by an 'urgency signal' , u(t). Further, the circuit performs divisive normalization at a slower timescale (see equation (3)).
For subsequent simulations, we use the following sequence of discretized steps for each time step of incoming momentary evidence: (1) accumulate evidence according to equation (2); (2) project the newly accumulated evidence onto a nonlinear manifold by iterating equation (4) (or equations (9) and (10)) five times; (3) perform divisive normalization as in equation (3); and (4) add independent noise ξ i on the individual output units (only for simulations corresponding to Figs. 5 and 6). We follow this sequence because we assume that the projection happens at a much faster timescale than divisive normalization (see main text). However, as we show in Supplementary Note 5, this particular order of time-discretized steps is inconsequential.
We found that a linear urgency signal, u(t) = βt + u 0 , approximates well the collapse of the optimal decision boundaries. In this instance, β and u 0 are the slope and offset of the function, respectively, which we optimized in the subsequent simulations to maximize the reward rates. For the nonlinear function f, we used a rectified power function
, with the exponent fixed to α = 1.5 (see Supplementary Fig. 3 for the dependence of optimal urgency signal on the nonlinearity). The update rate of the projection in equations (4) and (10) was fixed to γ = 0.4. We also fixed the gain of the divisive normalization term, K, to the mean reward across all trials and options, whereas σ h was optimized. We ran the simulation for T = 10 s with time steps of δt = 0.005 s. We identified the optimal parameters (that is, the parameters that maximize the reward rate) with an exhaustive search followed by a simplex optimization 58 . For N = 3 and N = 4, the circuit was confirmed to yield near-optimal reward rates for a reasonably wide range of the mean reward (from = z 0 to 5).
IIA violation, similarity effect and violation of the regularity principle. To simulate the third option effect that violates the IIA and regularity principles, and to reproduce the similarity effect, we perform simulations to reoptimize our optimal neural circuit for N choice options with independent variability added to each accumulator at every time step. We simulate the model for a fixed duration of T = 200 ms as in Louie et al. 11 with time steps of δt = 1 ms and pick the option with the highest accumulator value at the end of the trial. The rewards for the three options were chosen uniformly from z 1 ∈ [25, 35] , z 2 = 30 and z 3 ∈ [0,30]. The momentary evidence was uncorrelated for the IIA and regularity principles with Σ x = σ1; for the similarity effect, the momentary evidence for two of the choice options was positively correlated with the correlation coefficient 0.1.
Statistics.
Most figures are based on simulating our model using a sufficiently large number of trials (mentioned in the corresponding figure legends); this made the use of statistical testing unnecessary.
For Fig. 4c , we performed linear regression (RT = β 0 + β 1 log(N + 1)) to predict the reaction time based on a logarithmic function of the number of choices, log(N + 1), where N is the number of choices. We found a significant relation between reaction time and N for both value-based decisions (P = 5.2 × 10 
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